The Evolution of the ‘Populist Potential’ in European Politics: From New Right Radicalism to Anti-System Populism by Chryssogelos, Angelos
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1007/s12290-013-0249-3
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Chryssogelos, A. (2013). The Evolution of the ‘Populist Potential’ in European Politics: From New Right
Radicalism to Anti-System Populism. European View, 12(1), 75-83. DOI: 10.1007/s12290-013-0249-3
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
  
The Evolution of the ‘Populist Potential’ in European Politics: 
From New Right Radicalism to Anti-System Populism 
   Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos1 
 
Abstract  Over the past 30 years, responding to different international, political 
and economic circumstances, populists have formed, preserved, nurtured and 
expanded a political identity that is today present in most political systems in 
Europe. This identity constitutes a ‘populist potential’, in the sense that it is non-
ideological and that it wavers between electoral abstention and support for anti-
system parties. This essay provides a historical overview of the ideological and 
sociological evolution of the populist identity in Europe and reviews the ways 
parties of the centre–right have dealt with it in the past. Its conclusion is that 
practices like coalition building and theme co-optation are not so easy to deploy 
today, given the non-ideological and anti-system nature of the populist potential. 
 
Keywords  Populism – Radicalism – Crisis – Radical right – Coalition – Co-
optation  
 
Introduction 
 
This article will provide a short historical account of the rise and success of 
populism over the past four decades in order to distil some conclusions about the 
persistence and the nature of the populist challenge. It will argue that most 
European societies today are characterised by the existence of a ‘populist 
potential’, a significant part of the electorate that encompasses voters who 
actively subscribe to a populist, anti-establishment ideological identity together 
with voters who have stepped out of the party system altogether. This populist 
potential is energised by different discourses, takes many shapes and combines 
references to authoritarian ideological heritages with an ever-growing anti-
political ethos. This article will argue that this populist potential is today a 
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permanent fixture. It will also argue that, among moderate parties, the centre–
right in particular has been the most effective in countering the populist 
challenge. Today however, the centre–right’s strategic position is both privileged 
and precarious, a function of its sustained strength within a political system that 
is rapidly losing collective legitimacy.  
 
Phase 1, 1980s: the new radical right rises, the populist potential 
materialises 
 
There were outbursts of populist politics in the post-war period in Western 
Europe, but they were swiftly contained under the weight of robust party systems 
that performed fairly well the basic functions of party democracy (mobilisation, 
incorporation and representation of interests, and the recruitment and training of 
political elites). This was the golden age of party politics, when political parties 
represented political identities mobilised around a few dominant dimensions of 
opposition or cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990). This era came to a close in the 
1980s, when a new crop of populist politicians, with roots in the far right 
authoritarian tradition of Western European politics, made their appearance.   
 
This new radical right represented the effort of the heirs of discredited 
authoritarian traditions to update their image and message at times of newly 
encountered economic hardship. Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front 
(Front National, FN) in France, and Jörg Haider, leader of the Freedom Party of 
Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), were the most successful and 
persistent exponents of a populism that targeted corrupted elites and immigrants 
as responsible for a perceived economic and moral crisis. This ethnic populism 
was an updating of old far right traditions, of course, but the policy message was 
still unique because it was adapted to new social conditions. The new radical 
right responded to a perceived breakdown of authority and social order, thus 
attracting primarily people with an outlook that combined cultural authoritarianism 
and a sense of economic insecurity (Minkenberg 2000). In response to their 
  
needs, the new radical right’s populism combined a pronounced anti-immigrant 
discourse with a vocal neo-liberal populism, thus creating what political scientist 
Herbert Kitschelt had called ‘the winning formula’ of the populist right (Kitschelt 
1995).  
 
In terms of outlook, the new radical right of the 1980s could be seen as a 
radicalised wing of the broad conservative family. Its following was mostly middle 
class, albeit the part of the middle class that felt most vulnerable economically 
and culturally. Nevertheless, it also signalled a qualitative change in party 
competition in Western Europe in that its ethnic populism was particularly 
mobilised against New Left demands (about minorities, personal lifestyles and so 
on). While this radicalisation of a cultural axis of competition, pitting 
authoritarians versus social liberals, was still subsumed under the traditional 
socioeconomic left–right divide, the radical right had carved out a political area 
characterised by economic and cultural alienation, a veritable new political 
identity energised by an anti-establishment, yet still quite ideological, populism 
(Minkenberg 2000).  
 
Phase 2, 1990s: the new radical right consolidates and expands the 
populist potential 
 
The end of the Cold War and the advent of globalisation only served to galvanise 
the radical right political identity. The sense of cultural alienation was 
compounded by the erosion of national sovereignty in a world of free movement 
of people, goods and services. The radical right’s Euroscepticism (which was not 
very pronounced during the 1980s) became a marker for these parties’ 
opposition to the weakening of the nation state (Taggart 1998). Concurrently, 
these parties’ anti-elite populism was underpinned by the popular perception that, 
in an integrated Europe and a globalised world, there are few things elected 
governments can do. In this context, traditional political identities began to erode, 
but populists of the right could hold their own by subsuming anti-establishment 
  
themes into a loose political milieu whose core was still authoritarian-
conservative but whose veneer was attracting more and more newcomers.  
 
During the 1990s, anti-immigrant and anti-elite discourses remained the staple of 
the new radical right but crucial elements in its outlook began to change. In 
various countries (notably France and Austria) right-wing populists began to 
attract the support of people from beyond the core of the authoritarian middle-
class right. The radical right maintained the main elements of its laissez faire 
economics, yet it started making inroads into the working-class and youth vote by 
overcompensating on issues of law and order, sovereignty and cultural–ethnic 
alienation. The populist potential was still anchored on the right, but its 
membership was becoming sociologically varied and ideologically diffuse, with 
principled far right orthodoxy giving way to a general discontent with politics as 
the glue of the coalition (Mayer 2002). The entry of Haider’s FPÖ into the 
Austrian government in 2000 marks the apex of this period.  
 
Phase 3, 2000s: identity politics meets protectionism 
 
By the early 2000s mainstream parties seemed to have converged to a point of 
acceptance of the basic tenets of economic and cultural openness (Kriesi et al. 
2006, 926). Increasingly, the populist potential was losing its character as an 
authoritarian offshoot of the right wing. Radical right populists aligned their 
rhetoric more and more to the emerging cleavage between globalisation’s 
winners and losers. For heirs to old authoritarian traditions in France and Austria, 
this meant an exit from their comfort zone of vulnerable middle-class 
authoritarianism. The targeting of immigrants and law and order was combined 
with an ever more protectionist discourse on economic matters. It is not to be 
denied that the defining parameter of the populist potential in these countries 
remained culturally and ethnically authoritarian (Kriesi et al. 2006, 929). But 
populist leaders became much more explicit in their courting of the parts of the 
population that tangibly felt the externalities of economic openness (Azmanova 
  
2011). Programmatically, this meant that by the mid-2000s the FN and the FPÖ 
had shed their neo-liberalism (Bornschier 2011, 40), something that facilitated 
the amazing inroads both parties made into the working class vote, as well as 
their ability to mobilise people otherwise disenchanted with politics altogether 
(Knapp 2004).  
 
Strategically, this was expressed in the energising by populist parties of a 
protectionism–openness axis beyond the left–right divide, with the populist 
potential now forming the third peak in a triangle of competition pitting cultural 
and economic protectionists against the pro-openness centre–right and centre–
left. Discussions about whether the FN had triangulated the French party system 
were indicative of this move (Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003). The acrimonious 
exit of the FPÖ from government in Vienna in 2006 completed its own transition 
from a party of neo-liberal and authoritarian conservatism to one of populist 
protest incorporating working-class demands for protection (Luther 2008).  
 
The populist potential came to be captured by new types of actors. Some anti-
immigrant parties gave a cultural–ethnic spin to liberal values of tolerance and 
liberal democracy. In the context of the ‘war on terror’, these parties mobilised 
along cultural lines while appropriating liberal themes. This was a new recipe for 
success in countries with thin authoritarian traditions, such as the Netherlands 
and Denmark (Andersen 2007). Elsewhere, the diminishing ideological 
component of the populist potential allowed, for the first time, parties on the left to 
employ populism and capture part of the action. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, successful left-wing populist parties like the Left (Die Linke) and the 
Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) swapped traditional working-class 
radicalism for an inclusive appeal to middle-class and to non-ideological voters 
(March 2011). Finally, an altogether different breed of populism was becoming 
evident in Central and Eastern Europe, especially after the 2004 EU 
enlargement. There, under the influence of the Communist legacy, a populist 
potential combining authoritarian right-wing and protectionist left-wing themes 
  
has been formed, for example the Law and Justice party (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in Poland.  
 
Phase 4, 2010s and the crisis: between triangulation and anti-politics  
 
The economic crisis in Europe marks important points of continuity and change in 
the development of the populist potential. In terms of continuity, it supplies 
populist politicians who were already strongly anti-elitist, Eurosceptic and 
protectionist with the opportunity to intensify these themes with the aim of 
capturing a bigger share of an electorate that is increasingly disenchanted with 
politics. In terms of change, it signifies a moment of crisis of such magnitude that 
the very essence of liberal representative democracy is challenged.  
 
Elections in the eurozone since 2010 testify to the fact that the populist potential 
now constitutes an identity mobilised primarily by opposition to mainstream 
parties as such. Reflecting the radical right’s essential role in its initial 
formulation, the populist potential still exhibits a strong cultural protectionism. Yet 
in the current context this cultural component merges with a strong anti-elite and 
economically protectionist discourse to form a coherent anti-system message 
whose expression is only vaguely modified according to the ideological tradition 
of this or that leader. It seemed that in countries with both right-wing and left-wing 
populist parties, the two sides were competing as much in unison against the 
centre as they were between themselves to capture the same target audience 
that was experiencing middle-class disappointment, working-class alienation and 
youth exclusion. This was the case in 2012 with elections in France, the 
Netherlands and Greece. In Finland, on the other hand, the euro itself became 
an issue that allowed the emergence of a populist party advancing Eurosceptic 
and protectionist themes in 2011. 
 
Table 1 2012 Election results in four eurozone members 
 
  
 Finland, 
parliamentary 
elections (April 
2011) 
France, first 
round presidential 
elections (April 
2012) 
Netherlands, 
parliamentary 
elections 
(September 
2012) 
Greece, 
parliamentar
y elections 
(June 2012)  
Populist 
potential 
19.1% (PS) 29% (Le Pen and 
Melenchon) 
19.8% (PVV and 
SP) 
46% 
(SYRIZA, 
ANEL, 
Chrissi Avgi, 
KKE) 
Centre–right 24.4% (KOK and 
KD) 
27.2% (Sarkozy) 8.5% (CDA) 29.7% (ND) 
Centre–left 19.1% (SDP) 28.6% (Hollande) 24.8% (PvdA) 18.5% 
(PASOK, 
DIMAR) 
Abstention 29.4% (-2.6% 
from 2007) 
20.5% (+4.3% 
from 2007) 
25.4% (+0.8% 
from 2010) 
37.5% 
(+8.5% from 
2009) 
 
Sources: Data adapted from official election results available at the Greek Ministry of the Interior, 
www.ypes.gr, the Dutch Central Election Bureau, www.kiesraad.nl, the French Ministry of the 
Interior, www.interieur.gouv.fr, and the Finnish Ministry of Justice, www.vaalit.fi. 
Note: Finland: PS = Perussuomalaiset (True Finns), KOK = Kansallinen Kokoomus (National 
Coalition), KD = Kristillisdemokraatit (Christian Democrats), SDP = Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatinen Puolue (Social Democrats); Netherlands: PVV = Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(Freedom Party), SP = Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party), CDA = Christen-Democratisch Appèl 
(Christian Democratic Appeal), PvdA = Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party); Greece: SYRIZA = 
Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras (Coalition of the Radical Left), ANEL = Anexartitoi Ellines 
(Independent Greeks), Chrissi Avgi = Golden Dawn (neo-Nazis) KKE = Kommounistiko Komma 
Ellados (Communist Party of Greece), ND = Nea Dimokratia (New Democracy), PASOK = 
Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), DIMAR = Dimokratiki Aristera 
(Democratic Left). 
 
  
Such is now the potency of the populist potential, a mass wavering between 
political apathy and rage, informed less by prior ideological commitments than by 
a general anti-ethos, that new actors can dissect it and mobilise it by appealing to 
new issues altogether. The most recent example of this is the spectacular 
success of comedian Beppe Grillo in the Italian elections of February 2013. His 
movement represented a general dissatisfaction with the whole political class 
and mistrust in the traditional structures of political representation. Grillo’s 
success dwarfs the moderate inroads made by Pirate parties, mainly in 
Germany, where a new political identity was put forth around issues of new 
technologies and radical demands for accountability in political decision-making.  
 
The above examples show that the populist potential has by now escaped 
confinement on one side of the right–left axis of competition. It currently stands 
somewhere between the centre–right and the centre–left as the third peak of a 
tripolar space of competition (Kriesi et al. 2006, 950–1), and lying outside of party 
politics altogether, waiting to be energised by the right combination of 
circumstances and charismatic leadership. In some countries, like France, the 
populist right’s head start in introducing and shaping the populist potential means 
that it is still able to harness most of its support and set the tone of its political 
expression. In countries like Italy and Greece, the decades-old pervasive 
populism in the practices of mainstream parties is superseded by a mobilisation 
against the system as such, a kind of anti-populist populism.  
 
The centre–right and the populist potential: the limits of coalition and co-
optation 
 
When they first started, radical right parties seemed to be cutting straight into the 
support of moderate centre–right parties. But the less ideological and more broad 
the populist potential became, the more the centre–left started suffering losses. 
Most importantly, by virtue of their double function as ultra-right offshoots and as 
expressions of discontent, radical right parties served to realign the balancing 
  
point towards the right in various countries over the past 20 years. As 
expressions of discontent, they attracted many voters who, based on their class 
background, would have voted for labour parties in the past. But as principled 
opponents of the increasingly social-liberal centre–left and New Left (Bornschier 
2011), they usually did not escape their initial self-placement within the broad 
conservative pole of the party system.  
 
The early 2000s witnessed a barrage of victories of centre–right parties that 
formed governing coalitions with the radical right (Austria, Italy, Norway, and 
Netherlands). In other cases, the centre–right co-opted many of the themes 
populists put on the agenda, especially on issues of immigration and public 
order, incorporating legitimate public demands in moderate agendas (Kriesi et al. 
2006). This allowed for the support of populists to ebb (as Sarkozy managed to 
do with Le Pen in 2007), or for the emergence of populist parties to be pre-
empted altogether (for example, in Germany) (Kriesi et al. 2006, 940). The 
almost simultaneous denunciations of multiculturalism by Angela Merkel and 
David Cameron in 2011 were the high point of this strategy. 
 
Unfortunately, the ensuing financial crisis reconsolidated the populist potential 
around protectionist themes and, even more significantly, allowed it to harness a 
renewed non-ideological populism that challenges the very basis and legitimacy 
of representative democracy. This reincarnation of the populist potential poses 
new awkward questions to established parties. 
  
Some of the new anti-system parties seem to be mobilised around specific 
issues, for example Pirate parties around new technologies and information. As 
was proven in the demonstrations against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), this mobilisation puts new demands into the public agenda 
that are barely susceptible to the cognitive short cuts provided by the left–right 
axis. Put simply, these new-issue parties are strange animals, a bit like the early-
1980s Greens. But because they are mobilised around issues (demands for 
  
extreme transparency and real time online accountability), one can hope that 
their political identities will eventually restructure or be subsumed under existing 
patterns of competition, in the process rejuvenating the political game. 
 
But this is an optimistic scenario that applies only to issue conscious anti-system 
parties like the Pirates. As Beppe Grillo showed, demands for online 
accountability and direct democracy are much more potent when moulded in a 
language of radical anti-liberal dissent. Here, the issue around which mobilisation 
occurs is not positive (support for more transparency and new technologies for 
improvement of democracy), but negative (a vitriolic opposition against 
everything and everyone in charge, at home and in Europe). Grillo created a 
populist potential almost ex nihilo in Italy—his vote drew almost equally from left, 
right and non-affiliated voters. In other places the anti-system rage can be 
harnessed by neo-Nazis with experience in grassroots organisation (Greece), or, 
of course, by fresher expressions of the old and tested radical right, as happened 
with Marine Le Pen’s very successful anti-euro campaign in 2012. It really 
depends on the national context, the opportunities that party competition offers 
and the mistakes the ruling political class makes. In all these cases, there is little 
space for constructive engagement or coalition making: opposition to the system 
is the essence of the populist potential, and populists want to be sure that 
discontent is channelled in their favour in elections instead of feeding abstention. 
 
Apart from coalition making, the co-opting of themes by the centre–right is also 
much more difficult than before. First, populists today are almost totally given to a 
protectionist economic discourse. While cultural conservatism was easier to co-
opt for Christian Democratic and conservative parties, it is impossible for these 
parties to pre-empt protectionism and Euroscepticism without losing credibility. 
Second, and most important, in an integrated eurozone facing huge imbalances 
and tension between creditors and debtors, co-optation of populist themes in one 
country inescapably has repercussions elsewhere. Unfortunately, cultural values 
are diffuse and intangible; they can be shared, traded or altered virtually. But 
  
economic resources, unlike values, are finite. Laying claim to a resource, unlike a 
value, means that someone else will have less of it. At least inside the eurozone, 
mainstream parties function under very tight constraints. They cannot be seen to 
give in too much to their creditors (or debtors) before populists at home start to 
rise up, yet catering to populist sentiments at home feeds discontent on the other 
side of the creditor–debtor divide.  
 
Conclusion: no easy way out—but a way nonetheless  
 
If one observes the political landscape in Europe, one will see that the centre– 
right remains electorally dominant in most national settings. But this is a function 
more of the fact that other established forces, like social democracy and the 
centre–left, have suffered severe losses in the past decade. A closer observation 
would show that in most European party systems a significant part of the 
electorate is de-aligned from any permanent political identification and feels 
completely unrepresented by the stakes and terms of the discussion.  
 
This short historical overview shows that national context and political leadership 
allowed the nature of the populist potential to evolve from an ideological to an 
anti-establishment ethos. Today, the economic crisis and the crisis of European 
integration have created a more or less uniform social outlook of the populist 
potential across Europe, an outlook characterised by social and class 
heterogeneity, where ethnic authoritarianism is only one element next to 
economic protectionism and plain mistrust (or disgust) of politics, where right-
wing and left-wing themes merge seamlessly and where the expression of them 
wavers between abstention and support for old or new populists. Non-ideological 
and non-classifiable, a mirror image of insecure middle-class societies, 
unpredictable, torn between the breakdown of traditional identities and the need 
to rebuild a sense of collectivity in the face of global competition, such is the 
populist potential in a Europe in crisis.  
 
  
Under these circumstances, forcing populists to share in government 
responsibilities is difficult (either because their demands are completely new and, 
so far, non-absorbable, or because their populism is so non-ideological and anti-
system that entering government would be a negation of their existence), and co-
opting their demands causes strains in the management of the European project. 
However, if we understand the nature of the populist potential as a breeding 
ground of a new cultural authoritarianism that combines mistrust of 
representative institutions with opposition to economic openness, as I do in this 
article, we can at least begin to conceive of ways outside of partisan tactics to, if 
not counter the electoral rise of populists, at least make the democratic game 
itself more appealing.  
 
Perhaps the main conclusion to draw from this analysis is that today’s populist 
potential is mobilised less by specific ideological grievances than by a general 
discontent with democratic politics as such. This is unfortunate but it contains 
some seeds of opportunity. It potentially lays the burden not so much on an 
immediate delivery of policy outputs that are difficult and complicated to achieve 
(for example, drastic improvement of the economic climate), but on the creation 
of structures, institutions and practices that at least invite renewed popular 
participation and facilitate social input in policymaking processes.  
 
Politicians of mainstream parties understandably raise objections against 
measures that could bring about sub-optimal results, such as referenda, or that 
decrease the overall degree of experience possessed by political personnel, 
such as term limits for members of parliament. Yet considering these and other 
measures that will signal to electorates new mechanisms for participation and will 
increase the responsiveness of elites to societal demands is a relatively cheap 
way to renew the compact between societies and politics in Europe. It may not 
satisfy the urge of the populist potential for easy solutions ‘right here, right now’, 
but it will at least effectively counter the ongoing transformation of public 
  
discontent with party politics into authoritarian anti-political (and, potentially, anti-
democratic) projects.  
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